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THE FLORIDA MILITIA’S ROLE IN THE
BATTLE OF WITHLACOOCHEE
by G EORGE C. B ITTLE

T

HE BATTLE OF Withlacoochee, fought in a swampy wilderness on the last day of 1835, generated a controversy which
was more heated than the engagement itself. It was the Florida
militia’s first relatively large-scale battle, and unfortunately, a subsequent bitter exchange of recriminations took place between
Brigadier General Duncan Lamont Clinch, the regular army commander, and Brigadier General Richard Keith Call, Florida militia
commander and territorial governor. Thus the role of the Florida
men in their first serious military test became a matter of debate.
From the beginning, General Call denounced the army’s method of marching to the Indian village that the joint regular-militia
maneuver hoped to destroy. Call wanted to execute a rapid march
so that full advantage might be taken of the element of surprise.
The soldiers carried only four days rations and had left their
baggage at Fort Drane where the combined regular-militia force
had assembled. On the other hand, General Clinch decided that
his regulars needed a heavy, slow-moving baggage train to transport their supplies. General Call claimed Clinch had agreed to a
rapid march with no baggage train, and then took every wagon he
could find. In addition to this problem, many of Clinch’s men
owned dogs which they insisted upon taking with them, thus destroying all possibility of surprise. 1
It took three days to march the thirty-five miles to the Withlacoochee River since part of the time was consumed when the
troops lost their way. Clinch was accused of not having taken advantage of earlier opportunities to secure adequate topographical
knowledge of the area when the column went astray only a few
miles from Fort Drane, which was located on Clinch’s own plantation. Obviously, personal relations between the two commanders were not altogether pleasant as they proceeded on their way
to battle.

1. Richard Keith Call Journal, typescript, 351-52. Henceforth to be
referred to as the Call Journal. A microfilm copy is in the P. K. Yonge
Library of Florida History, Gainesville, Florida. See also Niles’ Weekly Register, August 19, 1837, 395.
2. Call Journal, 329, 351-53.
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TO reach the column’s goal it was necessary to cross the Withlacoochee River. Indian and Negro guides led the soldiers to a
ford of the river, supposedly waist-deep, only to find that because of flood conditions, it would be impossible to make a crossing. On the opposite bank was a 200 yard-wide hammock in
which the guides thought Seminoles were lurking. However, a
reconnaissance party which managed to traverse the river found
no Indians but did discover a number of fresh moccasin tracks.
Signs that Indians were somewhere nearby led to the regular
troops being ferried across the river in a small, leaky Indian canoe,
the only available facility. It was a dawn-to-noon operation to
transport the 260 regulars. 3 After crossing, the regulars
marched about a quarter of a mile through the hammock to an
open area bounded on two sides by a swamp and on one side by
heavy scrub timber. Stacking their arms, they scattered into small
groups. 4
After the regulars had crossed the river, the militiamen followed in the same canoe. Lieutenant Maxey Dill of Colonel John
Warren’s Florida militia command swam across on his horse, but
had to leave his weapons behind. The feat required much daring,
but the technique was impractical if arms could not be carried
over. In order to facilitate the militia’s crossing, Clinch and
Call ordered the construction of a log bridge, but, as it turned out,
the battle began before this bridge was finished. 5 At the time of
the Indian attack, approximately twenty-seven militiamen had
crossed the river and were guarding the horses and baggage. 6
When the Indians first began shooting, it was not clear on
which side of the river there would be the heaviest fighting, since
some of the opening shots were fired at the bulk of the militia
force which were waiting transportation across the water. General Call temporarily halted his crossing operation and formed
his remaining men into a line of battle, standing with their backs
3. Ellen Call Long, Florida Breezes; or, Florida New and Old (Jacksonville, 1883), 202. See also Mark F. Boyd, “The Seminole War: Its
Background and Onset,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XXX (July
1951), 81-2.
4. John Lee Williams, The Territory of Florida (New York, 1837),
222-23.
5. Long, Florida Breezes, 202. See also Boyd, “The Seminole War,” 81-2.
6. Niles’ Weekly Register, January 30, 1836, 366. See also the Tallahassee Floridian, February 20, 1836; Williams, The Territory of
Florida, 222-23.
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to the river. 7 Call’s action was perhaps the wisest under the circumstances, since no one seemed to know where the Seminoles
were hiding. 8
When it became apparent that the main segment of the
militia force would not be seriously attacked, Call resumed his
efforts to move his force across the river. At one point, Call
ordered his men to mount their horses and charge across, but
the steep bank plunged the horses directly into swimming depth,
and weapons and ammunition were soaked. Obviously this technique had little value. Even Call was forced to use the canoe,
rather than go across astride his horse. 9 In a letter written
three years later (January 1838) to Call, Militiaman Thomas
Johns insisted that no man could have swum the river without
losing his arms or wetting his powder. 10 The actual battle lasted
approximately an hour, and the hardest part of the fighting occurred during a twenty-five minute period. Thus it would seem that
it would have been impossible for General Call to have gotten
all his men across the river, using the single canoe, in so short
a time. 11
While moving his force, General Call also had to contend
with an attempted desertion effort by a number of his men. John
Bemrose, a regular army medical attendant, revealed that a group
of mounted Florida men came to his hospital camp demanding
rations. Suspecting them to be deserters, Bemrose said that he
refused their requests. The men then threatened to use force, but
the sick and injured regulars in the hospital scared them off. 12
When the battle actually started, Colonel John Warren and
Lieutenant Colonel W. J. Mills, militiamen who had crossed the
river voluntarily, took up the defense of the regulars’ flanks. 13
General Call, who made his crossing during the action, played an
important role in the defense of the right flank. General Clinch
admitted that the militia who joined in the battle met the Indian
7. Tallahassee Floridian, February 20, 1836. See also Myer M. Cohen,
Notices of Florida and the Campaigns (Charleston, 1836), 82.
8. Cohen, Notices of Florida and the Campaigns, 82.
9. Long, Florida Breezes, 204.
10. Tallahassee Floridian, January 1, 1838.
11. Ibid, January 9, 1836. See also Niles’ Weekly Register, August 19,
1837, 395-96; Rembert W. Patrick, Aristocrat in Uniform: General
Duncan L. Clinch (Gainesville, 1963), 105.
12. John Bemrose, “Reminiscences of the Seminole War,” 56-7. Microfilm copy in the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, Gainesville.
13. Jacksonville Courier, January 7, 1836.
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attack with firmness and vigor. 1 4 Call credited the militia’s role
in the fight with preventing the regulars from having their retreat
route to the river bank cut. 15 What General Call claimed is probably true; defending this flank was an important service. However, the fact remains that very few militiamen actually took part
in the fighting.
There is no question that the regulars bore the brunt of
battle. However, even these soldiers were at least partly under the
command of militia officers. Colonel Samuel Parkhill, Florida
Militia, served as Clinch’s adjutant, and Colonel Leigh Read, also
of the militia, was inspector general. 16 At the first Indian volley,
the regulars retreated pell-mell about a hundred yards before General Clinch or Colonel Parkhill could reform them. As the regulars’ rank were thinned, the soldiers forgot their discipline and
huddled together. Realizing what was happening, General Clinch
ordered a charge, f o l l o w e d b y a s e c o n d o n e t h a t e n d e d
the battle. 17
It was not until after this victorious charge that Call advised
Clinch that he would not support pursuit of the Seminoles with
his militia. In his report General Call argued that the large number of wounded and the lack of supplies made retreat necessary.
However, on the battlefield, Call gave as a reason for his decision
the fact that many of his men’s enlistments ended the following
day, making their further services of limited value. From the beginning of the campaign, Call had informed Clinch that his militiamen could serve only a few days. 18 It is difficult to determine
which of Call’s stated reasons was the one he really believed.
There is also the fact that Call probably was not exactly sure when
the enlistments ended.
14. General Duncan L. Clinch Papers. Henceforth referred to as the
Clinch Papers. Microfilm copy in the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida
History, Gainesville. See also Niles Weekly Register, January 30,
1836, 366.
15. R. K. Call to John H. Eaton, January 8, 1836, House Documents, 25th
Cong., 2 n d S e s s . , N o . 7 8 , 324. See also American State Papers:
Military Affairs, 7 vols. (Washington, 1832-1861), VII, 220.
16. Clinch Papers. See also Niles’ Weekly Register, January 30, 1836,
366.
17. Long, Florida Breezes, 203-04. See also R. C. Stafford, “The Bemrose
Manuscript on the Seminole War,” Florida Historical Quarterly,
XVIII (April 1940), 289-90.
18. Williams, The Territory of Florida, 221, 223. See also Samuel E.
C o b b , “T h e F l o r i d a M i l i t i a a n d t h e A f f a i r a t W i t h l a c o o c h e e , ”
Florida Historical Quarterly, XIX (October 1940), 133; Call to
Eaton, January 8, 1836, House Documents, 25th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
No. 78, 324; American State Papers: Military Affairs, VII, 220.
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Let us return to a chronological account of the battle events
before exploring the problems connected with militia participation. Clinch accepted Call’s plan of retreat across a makeshift
log bridge, partially built during the fight. The line of battle was
now formed in the shape of a horseshoe, the left flank resting on
the bridge and the right on the river bank. The retreat was accomplished from left to right with the men defending their perimeter by facing the enemy. The last man to recross the river was
Lieutenant Colonel W. J. Mills, a Florida soldier. Call actually
commanded the retreat; Clinch was fatigued from the battle and
was among the first to recross the river. 19 Meanwhile, some Indians were still present on the battle side of the river, and no
one was sure whether the Indians might not try to regroup and
renew the attack. 20
On the return journey to Fort Drane, the wounded soldiers received almost no medical attention, although the Florida militiamen did what they could to make them comfortable. During the
retreat, the militiamen were not the careless outriders they had
been en route to the fight. Stationed as flankers, they pressed
in close to the edge of the main column, and Bemrose claimed
that they would have fled if they had been attacked by the
Indians. 21
It is a debatable question as to which side won the Battle of
Withlacoochee since both the Indians and the Americans withdrew. Likely the Indians will have to be credited with victory;
at least they achieved their objective of stopping the white military advance into their area. General Clinch’s failure to achieve
a decisive victory also increased the confidence of the Seminoles. 22
The three companies of Florida Militia that arrived at Fort
Drane after Call’s men had left for home were discharged by General Clinch since they showed signs of mutinous and insubordinate
conduct. 23 The conduct of Call’s soldiers may not have been
completely the cause of their discharge, however, since there were
questions about their terms of enlistment. In a letter to Andrew
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Tallahassee Floridian, January 11, 1838. See also Long, Florida
Breezes, 205.
Tallahassee Floridian, January 11, 1838.
Bemrose, “Reminiscences of the Seminole War,” 70, 74.
Niles Weekly Register, February 6, 1836, 395.
J. A. Quigg, “Brevet Brigadier General Duncan Lamont Clinch and
h i s F l o r i d a S e r v i c e ” ( u n p u b l i s h e d M a s t e r ’s t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y o f
Florida, 1963), 53.

Published by STARS, 1965

5

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 44 [1965], No. 4, Art. 5
308

F LORIDA H ISTORICAL Q UARTERLY

Jackson on December 22, 1835, Call stated that he had raised his
force only for a four-week period and that the men were not
happy about being assigned to an offensive campaign. Call feared
that many of his men would desert and go home to defend their
families. Ellen Call Long said that her father, General Call, told
her the men were so hastily enlisted that no stipulation concerning the length of their service had been made, and, that as the
novelty of camp life wore off and the dangers of a campaign became apparent, many men decided to return home. Call lectured
his men on the need of punishing the Seminoles for their actions,
and thanked the soldiers for what they had already done. The
militiamen, according to this account, finally agreed to serve an
additional ten days. 24 Considering the lack of organization of the
Florida Militia at this time and the traditionally independent attitude of most frontiersmen, Mrs. Long’s version was probably
nearer the truth than her father’s correspondence with Jackson
would have one believe.
When the discharge dates of the companies in Call’s command
are examined, there is even more reason to believe that the men
had agreed upon an indefinite term of service. While the first
company was discharged on January 13, the final group was not
25
It would seem that even the
mustered out until February 6.
first of the men scheduled to be discharged could have been utilized in pursuit of the Indians, at least on the day following the
fighting at Withlacoochee. This might have helped convince the
Indians that the whites really intended to pursue and to win
the war.
Another matter relating to the militia’s activities at Withlacoochee is the question of why more militia troops did not cross
the river and join the fighting. Immediately after the battle there
does not seem to have been any conflict between the militiamen
and the regular soldiers. Even Colonel John Sprague, whose account of the war was not published until 1848, believed that the
24. Call to Andrew Jackson, December 22, 1835, Clarence E. Carter
(ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United States, 26 vols. (Washington, 1834-1962), XXV, 216-17. See also the Call Journal, 350-51;
Call to Jackson, December 22, 1835, House Documents, 25th Cong.,
2nd Sess., No. 78, 319.
25. American State Papers: Military Affairs, VI, 1068. See also Niles’
Weekly Register, February 6, 1836, 394.
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few Florida men who had managed to cross the river rendered
efficient service. 26
The West Florida militiamen were honored with a public dinner in Tallahassee after their return from the fighting. Toasts
were made to the good relations between the Florida and regular
soldiers. The Pensacola Gazette reported, January 16, 1836, that
all the militiamen behaved well under fire and that many officers
and men had distinguished themselves on the occasion. The St.
Augustine Examiner also praised the Florida men and said that
by the standard of Indian fights, this one had been severe. The
St. Augustine Florida Herald reported that the fighting was mainly
between the regulars and the Seminoles, but levelled no criticism
of the militia. In a second article, the paper said General Clinch
had distinguished himself at Withlacoochee. The Key West
Inquirer, at least through March 1836, made no mention of the
battle. 27 Apparently the controversy over the conduct of the
Florida militia at the battle developed at a later date.
The debate over the militia’s failure to cross the Withlacoochee did not become widespread until some time later, in 1837
and 1838. There were rumblings, however, in newspapers in
1836. The Savannah Georgian in January 1836 claimed that
about 300 Florida men had crossed the river, only to huddle together on the river bank and then to flee back across at the first
shots. 28 The Washington Globe asked why the bulk of the militia
did not take part in the fighting, but placed the blame on no
one. 29 In his 1836 annual report, General Alexander Macomb,
commander of the United States Army, said he did not know why
only twenty-seven Florida men had been involved, but that if all
of the militia troops had shown the zeal of those men, the war,
in all likelihood, would have ended with this battle. 30 In answer
to a letter from General Call, Macomb, on August 23, 1837,
John T. Sprague, The Origin, Progress, and Conclusion of the Florida
War (New York, 1848), 92. While Sprague was not in Florida at
the time of the battle, he is considered an authority on the war.
27. Pensacola Gazette, January 16, 1 8 3 6 . S e e a l s o t h e T a l l a h a s s e e
Floridian, January 9, 16, 1836; Key West Inquirer, December 1835
through March 1836; St. Augustine Florida Herald, January 6, 1836,
and American State Papers: Military Affairs, VI, 21.
28. Niles’ Weekly Register, January 30, 1836, 369.
29. Tallahassee Floridian, February 13, 1836.
30. Call Journal, 326-27.
26.
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wrote that at the time of his report he had not known all the facts
but would now be glad to publicize Call’s views. 31
General Clinch wrote to Secretary of War Lewis Cass on July
22, 1837, and stated that after the fighting began, he had sent
Colonel Leigh Read to find out why the volunteers were not crossing the river. At the end of the fight, Clinch claimed Call had appeared and said that the volunteers were at their posts. Several
militiamen, according to Clinch, stated that Call had ordered them
not to cross the river. As a further insult to Call, Clinch asked
why he had ever been appointed governor of Florida when his
military reputation was being seriously questioned by the federal
government. 3 2 In reply, General Call published an open letter in
the Niles’ Weekly Register on August 19, 1837, explaining that
it had taken all morning to cross the almost 260 regulars in a
canoe. He wondered how Clinch expected the Florida Militia to
cross in the twenty-five minutes while the battle was at its peak. 33
This exchange of public letters included much personal
recrimination, particularly on Call’s part, that had little or nothing to do with Clinch’s professional competence. Niles’ Weekly
Register published letters to Call from Samuel Parkhill and R. G.
Wellford, both Florida militia officers, supporting Call’s statements. 34
The crux of the crossing argument was reached on January
11, 1838, when the Tallahassee Floridian devoted three pages
to letters from General Call and his fellow militiamen, all giving
essentially the same reasons why the bulk of the Florida troops
had not joined in the fighting. From this correspondence, it is
concluded that General Call had never given an order forbidding
his men to cross the river, and that every effort, including the
constant use of the one available canoe, was made to reenforce
Clinch’s regulars. 35 John Bemrose’s statement that only a few
of the Florida militiamen tried to cross the river appears to be
true in a strict sense, but at best is misleading. 36 During the
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Major General Alexander Macomb Letter, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina. Microfilm copy in P. K. Yonge
Library of Florida History, Gainesville.
Tallahassee Floridian, July 22, 1837.
Niles’ Weekly Register, August 19, 1837, 395-96.
Ibid., 397-98.
Tallahassee Floridian, January 11, 1838. See also Call Papers for the
original letters and copies.
Bemrose, “Reminiscences of the Seminole War,” 68.
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one-hour battle, only a few men could have made use of the canoe
and no other practical means of crossing the river was at hand.
It seems that with the exception of a potential pursuit of the
Indians after the fighting, the Florida militia participated to the
fullest extent possible in the Battle of Withlacoochee.
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